Robert V. Tiller and Mildred Molinari v. Loren G. Norton et al : Brief of Defendants and Cross-Defendants (Respondents) by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
Robert V. Tiller and Mildred Molinari v. Loren G.
Norton et al : Brief of Defendants and Cross-
Defendants (Respondents)
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Tiller v. Norton, No. 7770 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1644
- In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RQBERT V. TILLER, also known as 
ROBERT V. TILLIER, also known 
as ROBERT B. SWANN, and MIL-
DRED MOLINARI, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. 
NORTON, administrator of the Es-
tate of CHARLES CARSON, also 
;~~ - · known as H. F. SWANN, also 
;,:' 
I' 
·.1' 
·! , ' 
}'~'.! 
I~ 'r " 
~ ~ ~-~ ·, 
. ~\·\ 
k\ 
known as R. C. TILLER, also 
known as ROBERT C. TILLER, 
deceased, and THE EMPLOYERS 
LIABILITY ASSURANCE COR-
PORATION, LTD., a corporation, 
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ecutor of the Estate of Grace Cath-
erine Carson, deceased and E. LE 
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LAKE CITY, a corporation sole, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for defendant, The Em players Liability Assur-
ance Co'l'poration, Ltd. 
SHIELDS & SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for E. LeRoy Shields, E. LeRoy Shields, Executor 
of the Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, Loren G. Norton, 
administrator of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson, 
deceased, and Loren G. Norton, individually. 
R. VERN McC·ULLOUGH, 
Attorney for cross defendant Edith Hazelrigg 
TOHN D. RICE, 
~ Attorney for eroS's defendant Cathedral of the Magdalene 
Catholic Church, also known as Roman Catholic Bishop 
of Salt Lake City,· a corporation sole. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by the purported son and daughter of 
the deceased to recover from the administrator and his bonds-
man for alleged fraud ·of the administrator in proceeding to 
distribute all of the .estate to the widow pursuant to the decree 
of distribution of the Third District Court. 
The allegation of fraud is generally the alleged failure 
of the administrator to make a full disclosure to the District 
Court of facts known by the administrator. The District Court 
found that the Probate Coutt had been informed and possessed 
of all the facts known by the administrator, all of which had 
been disclosed · in contested proceedings ·extending over a 
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period of many. months. The defendants contend and the 
Court found that there had been no concealment or breach 
of duty. The facts follow: 
Charles Carson died October 8, 1948 (R. 3). On October 
11, 1948, a petition was filed by Dr. Howard T. Anderson, 
represented by W. D. Beatie, praying for letters of adminis-
tration of the estate of the said deceased (Ex. L-1; P-1). The 
funeral was held October 12, 1948 (R. 4). 
On the next day Grace Catherine Carson, the widow, filed 
a petition for letters of administration, in which she stated 
ttthat he left him surviving the following heirs at law: Grace 
Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein, and no other pres-
ently known heirs at law." At the time of the filing of the 
petition for letters DL Anderson also filed a petition praying 
for the appointment of Tracy-Collins Trust Company to be 
special . administrator of the estate of Charles C·arson, and 
this appointment was obtained ex parte on October 11, 1948. 
(Ex. L-1; Order of October 11, 1948). 
On October 14~ 1948, the caption· of the cause initiated 
by Anderson was amended ex parte by adding after the words 
ccCharles Carson," the words ((also known as H. F. Swann, 
also known as Henry F .. Swann." Subsequently the caption was 
amended further to add the words, ((also known as R. C. 
Tiller, also known as Robert C. Tiller." 
All such petitions having been consolidated for h~aring, 
there ensued in this proceeding a series of objections, cross-
objections, answers arid amended petitions and protests, in 
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which two pertinent questions were raised. These were: ( 1) 
· whether Grace Catherine Carson was in fact a surviving widow 
of Charles Carson, and ( 2) whether there were children liv-
ing in Chicago or elsewhere of Charles Carson, as claimed by 
the special administrator. These questions were pertinent be-
cause they were involved in determining the question of priority 
in the appointment of the administrator of the estate and also 
because they were involved in determining the heirship of 
the children. The details of the hearings on these various pe-
titions and cross-petitions are set out in plaintiffs' brief and 
in plaintiffs' complaint and amended and second amended 
complaints. The ensuing hearings relative to these questions 
were pursued over a period of approximately nine months. 
I-Iearings were held particularly on November 26, 1~48, 
December 8, 1948, January 19, 1949, January 26, 1949, Feb-
ruary 23, 1949, February 26, 1949, March 25, 1949, May 23, 
.1949, and June 11, 1949. (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 147). 
During the hearings it became apparent that a . number o! 
efforts had beeri made to locate the. purported two children of 
Charles Carson both before and after his death. Carson him-
self. had made either one· or two trips to Chicago and other 
parts of the Middle West to locate the children. · He had 
employed Lawrence Barclay, of the firm of Barclay and Bar-
clay of Salt Lake City, to assist in making the search. ·He 
had s.ent ·letters to former acquaintances ·in the Midwest and 
Chicago area~ to endeavor to ascertain further information 
concerning the children. 
Lawrence Barclay, represen~ing Carson, had· likewise 
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\Yritten a number of letters to various public officials and 
agencies in an effort to find the purported children. The special 
administrtaor had also made a very serious attempt to locate 
them. Between sixty and seventy letters were sent to various 
individuals and agencies at the addresses indicated in Carson's 
effects. The entire nine months were devoted to the search, 
and the entire search was reported to the District Court at 
the various hearings on this matter. 
In the instant case the Court found that ttsaid search 
included the contacting by mail and by telephone of all known 
friends and relatives of the deceased in the states and cities of 
. . 
his residence prior to Salt Lake City, to-wit: West Virginia, 
Ohio, Illinois and South Dakota; that in this search, public 
officials were contacted requesting their assistance in this. 
search, including sheriffs, chiefs of police and librarians. Search 
was also made through medical schools in an attempt to locate 
the purported grandson, being the son of Mildred Swann Moli-
nari, and particularly inquiry was made of the chiefs of police 
of Chicago, Illinois, and Omaha, Nebraska, wit& correspond-
ence approximating sixty or seventy pieces of ·mail forwarded 
- ~ 
and received in this search, in addition·- to the. personal investi-
gations and telephone conversations." (Finding of Fact No. 
8; R. 146). 
The attorneys . for the special administrator were paid 
$550.00 for their services in attempting to locate the pur-
ported children; $100.00 ·~ras allowed to Lawrence Barclay 
for his services performed in connection with the search for 
the alleged children, and the sum of $150.96 was fl;lrther 
awarded to the special administrator for expenses incurred 
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in searching for Carson's alleged children. ' (Finding of Fact 
No. 13; R. 149). 
In addition to the evidence before th~ Court concerning 
the alleged children the Probate Court in the · hearing 
heretofore mentioned heard a. great deal of testimony 
and evidence of various kinds as to whether Grace Catherine 
Carson was in fact the wife of Charles Carson. There was 
a deposition taken at the LDS Hospital, where Mrs. Carson 
was seriously ill, as appears from the ·deposition itself. Testi-
mony was obtained from a number of other witnesses. 
At the conclusion of all of this testimony, and as a deter~ 
mination of the qu~stions presented by the petitions, cross-
petitions and pleadings, the Probate Court on July 22, 1949, 
made written Findings and conclusions in which it deter·· 
mined that Carson etc. ((Left him surviving the following nam-
ed heirs at law: Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner 
herein." (R. 148). 
The special administrator thereupon filed his petition for 
final account and turned the assets over to the administrator. 
(See Exhibit L-1, Petition dated July 7, 1949). The admin-
istrator immediately entered upon his duties and caused notice 
to creditors to be pub~ished. (Ex. L-1; Order of July 29, 1949, 
and Proof of Publication dated July 19, 1949. Questions arose 
concerning the sufficiency of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree, and the written Findings, Conclusions and Decree 
were actually signed July 22, 1949. (Ex. L-1). 
. The administrator thereupon paid various claims and dis-
10 
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tributed the estate pursuant to a court order. The know ledge 
that ~Irs. Carson had of Charles Carson· s children is sum-
marized in Findings of Fact Nos. 15 and 16. (R. 150-151). 
Witnesses kne\Y that ~1r. Carson had made trips to the State 
of Illinois to determine the whereabouts of the children. At 
the time of Carson's death, Loren G. Norton called one 
Harry Costello of Toledo, Ohio, to determine whether c·os-
tello had any knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of 
the children, and Costello reported that he had no such tn-
formation. 
During the hearings, and prior to the entry of the decree 
by the Court, ((defendants Norton and Shields and Grace 
Catherine Carson did not fail to disclose any information they 
had as to the whereabouts of said children, and that said de-
fendants made a full and complete disclosure of all facts, in-
formation and knowledge in their possession to the Court; 
that in some instances the source of information had by Grace 
Catherine Carson and defendant Norton was different than 
the source of information reported. to the Court by· special 
administrator, but that in no instan<;:e did said persons fail 
to disclose any information· 1n their possession.'' (Finding of 
Fact .No. 15 Ibid.) 
Following the signing of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree by Judge Jeppson in connection with the appointment 
of the administrator, both Loren G. Norton and his counsel, 
((and all other interested parties, relied upon such findings 
and conclusions and decree, and accepted and relied upon the 
fact and l~w that Judge Joseph G. Jeppson passed upon the 
que~tion of heirship relative. to the estate of Charles Carson, 
11 
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deceased, and that at. said time and thereafter Loren G. Nor-
ton an.d E. LeRoy Shields believed that a full, complete and 
thorough search had been made · in said estate to determine 
and discover the whereabouts ·and existe~ce, if any, of Mildred 
Swann Molinari and Robert V. Tiller, plaintiffs herein, who 
had been represented as being the children of Charles Carson, 
deceased, and that the said Loren G. Norton, and E. LeRoy 
Shields in good faith believed that further search or inquiry 
would not disclose any facts which had not been revealed in 
the search by the special administrator and others, as fully 
disclosed to the Court." (Finding No. ~6; R. 151). 
Neither Norton nor Shields, his counsel, at any time ob-
jected to the procedure or investigation made and directed by 
the Court to attempt to discover the whereabouts of any chil-
dren of Carson, and they did not withhold any information 
concerning these children. (Finding of Fact No. 17; R. 151). 
The reason of. the difficulty in locating either of the 
two plaintiffs is readily apparent from their own testimony. 
Mildred Molinari could not remember the number · of names 
she had used since 192~1 (R. 469). Her best judgment at 
the commencement of the cross-examination on the question 
was about five (Ibid). She used the name ((Mildred Allen" 
in Detroit, Michigan, · to an arresting officer or court of-
ficial (R. 469, 470) ·. In 1932 in Chicago she used the name 
((Mildred Pelligrini" (Ibid). The name ((Pell(grini" at that 
time was given to a judge. or clerk. S~e remembered that the 
name of the person to whom she gave that name was Judge 
O'Connell. 
12 
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Nineteen days later, on October 26, 1932, in Chicago, 
she represented herself as ttAnn M~nners." She gave that 
name to a Judge Graver (R. 471). On January 24, 1934, 
she gave her name as ((Mildred Felli" in California to a judge. 
On December 14, 1935, in St. Paul, Minnesota, she gave the 
name nMarian Russo." This name was also given to a public 
officer (R. 472). Ori October 27, 1937, in Chicago, she 
gave her name as ttJoan Wood" to a Judge McCormick (R. 
472). On February 10 ,1932, before Judge McCormick in 
Chicago, she gave her name as (tMarcella Gordon" (R. 473) 
On March 12, 1938, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, she gave her 
name as ((Mildred Pelligrini," and again the name was given 
to a public officer (R. 473). On March 15, 1941, in Chicago, 
she gave her name as ((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Sergeant Grif-
fith. She also gave the name ((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Judge . 
Schiller in making a public record of her name (R. 474). On 
August 9, 1948, in Chicago, she gave her name as ((Mildred 
Pelligrini," and on January 17, 1950, she gave her name as 
((Mildred Pelligrini" to a Judge Donahue Harris (R. 474). 
Mrs. Pelligrini or Molinari, or whatever her name was, 
or is, was asked: 
· ICQ. During this period of time of 1948, that would 
be August 9, 1948, ·to the present time, have you 
ever had occasion to represent yourself to any pub-
lic officer there at your address at W ashtenaw 
A venue as to identify yourself by name? ? 
A. I don't remember." (R. 476). · 
* * * * * 
1) 
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nQ. Have you ever represented yourself to any public 
official, clerk or otherwise as Mildred Molinari ? 
A. I dont think so." (R. 476). 
* * * * * 
'~Q. You couldn't name one instance for us where you 
have publicly made a record of your name as Mil-
dred Molinari ? 
A. I don't remember whether I did or not. 
Q. You can thin~· of none at the present time? 
. A. No. 
Q. Do you have any real property in your name? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you own any real property? 
A. Yes. 
Q .. And it· is a fact, is it, that whatever property you 
claim to own is in. the name. of your son? 
A. That is right." (R. 477). 
Mrs. Molinari or Pelligrini then sta.ted that she had title 
to real property in the name of Anthony Molinari and Thomas 
Pelligrini. Mrs. Molinari could not. recall any information con-
. ~erning her contacts with the relatives of her former husband 
whatsoever (R. 482). She admitted that she had not been 
in touch with any of her own relatives (R. 485). For a period 
14 
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of several years none of her relatives even knew of her ad-
dress (R. 486, 487). She herself had never made any effort 
to find out \Yhat had happened to her father's property at 
V etal, ·South Dakota ( R. 48 7) . She did not recall ever having 
had a social security number (R. 492). Despite the fact that 
she testified she was doing business for herself and had a 
telephone HOgden Courts Cleaners," she had never identified 
herself by filing any affidavit of assumed name or similar 
affidavit in or around Chicago (R. 492). She had never had 
a telephone listed in the name of .that business in Chicago (R.· 
492, 493). ·As far as she knew at the time of the trial spe 
had never had a telephone listed in her name in any telephone 
directory (R. 493, 494). At the time of her deposition she 
stated definitely that she had not had a telephone listing in 
the telephone book in her own name (R. 494). She ·has 
· never owned an automobile (R. 496). She · could not ever 
remember having a dri~er's license (R. 495, 496). Later she 
stated that in 193 3 or 1934, when she was in California, she 
had a driv:er's license under the name of nPelligrini" (R. 497). 
She did obtain a driver's lic~nse on July 19, 1950, but she 
could not remember whether Cox and Company, nMissing 
Heir" investigators, who allegedly turned up the purported 
heirs, had anything to do with that (R. 498). In Chicago she 
voted since 19~17 under the name of nPelligrini" (R. 499) 
Certainly it is not difficult to understand why any of the 
searches made for a person under the name nMildred Moli-
nari" were not successful; in fact, it appears that it would al-
most have been an impossibility for one to find her in a city 
the size of Chicago under the conditions and circumstances 
15 
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in which she lived. If she had purposely cut herself off from 
all of her friends and relatives, and particularly from her 
father and his interests, it is difficult to imagine how she 
could have done a more complete job. 
During all of the probate proceedings tn the Charles 
Carson estate the only name that anyone suggested as to the 
purported son of Charles. Carson was R. V. Till~r and Robert 
V. or R. V. Swann. The plaintiff in this action was interro-
gated concerning his activities and the names which he haq 
used since approximately _1926 or 1927. During all of that 
peri~d of time he was unable. to point out one instance where 
any ·other name was used than Robert or Robert V. or R. V. 
Tillier. Exhibit A, a series of drivers' licenses and renewals 
for the .years 1947, 48, 59 and 50, authorizing the owner 
of the · license to operate a public conveyance in the City of 
Chicago, all referred to Robert Tillier .. Exhibit B, which was 
a series of City of Chicago Vehicle Licenses ·for the years 
. . 
1947, 48 and · 49 all .referred to Robert V. Tillier at 4707 
Kenmore Avenue, Chicago. 
Exhibit C, which is a series of chauffeur's licenses for 
the State of Illinois, for the years 1946, 1945, 1948, .1945, 
1942 refer to Robert Tillier at 4707 Kenmore Avenue, Chi-
cago, and 45_39 :North Racine Avenue, Chicago~ .. 
Exhibit D, which likewise is a series of drivers' or chauf-
feur's licenses for the State of Illinois for the years 1939, · 
1940 and 194i, refer to Robert Tillier at 607 Oakdale Avenue, 
648 Oakdale A venue and 1647 South California A venue, . all 
in Chicago. 
. 16 
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This plaintiff \vas registered as a voter under the name of 
Robert Tillier (Ex. E). 
Exihbit F indicates that he was employed by Thompson's 
Restaurants as Robert Tillier. 
. Exhibit G indicates that his telephone notices came to 
Robert V. Tillier. 
Exhibit H shows that his rent was paid under the name 
of Robert V. T illier. 
Exhibit I indicates that his light bills ·were paid under 
the name Robert T illier. 
Exhibit J indicates that his gas bills were paid as Robert 
V. Tillier. 
Exhibit K shows thaf his income tax returns were paid 
under the name Robert Tillier. 
Exhibit L indicates that in· the year 1946, while in Cali-
fornia, he went under the name Robert Victor Tillier. 
The fact in this regard is that the plaintiff admitt.ed that 
he had used the name Tillier at all times for all purposes since 
1926 or 1927. At no place where plaintiff used a name did 
he use the name ((Tiller" or the name uSwann." 
17 
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~e too had lost contact with all of his relatives and any 
friends of the family which existed in Vetal, South Dakota, 
or Chicago or any other place prior to approximately , 1925 
or 1926. He was a transient most of. his life, going from state 
to state; couldn't remember most of the time where he was 
during a given period. He claims he changed his name about 
1923-6. 
nWhy did you change your name from Swann to Tillier ?" 
nl wanted to go back to the family name." 
((Why not Tiller then?" 
Ctl liked the sound of Tillier. Only reason." He had never 
made any effort to locate his ·father except that one letter was 
sent to the county recorder at Martin, South Dakota, in or 
about the year 1947 or 1938 . to determine if his father still 
owned sotne property (R.265-267). He testified that he knew 
of the \vhereabouts of his sister during the greater part of 
this periqd of time, but it is very apparent from his testimony 
\ . ; . 
that he ·had most certainly failed to· keep any connections of 
his former associations. Again, if an effort had been know-
ingly made to cut himself off from all former relatives, friends 
and acquaintances, a more complete job could hardly have been 
imagined or planned than was done by the plaintiff in this 
action . 
. Condensing the claims of plaintiffs against Norton, as 
the same appear in Paragrauph 12 of the Second Amended 
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Complaint, the plaintiffs, right to recover is based upon the 
following claimed acts of fraud: 
1. That Norton knew at the time he consented to be the 
nominee of the widow Grace Catherine Carson, (a) that 
plaintiffs were the heirs of Carson and. were living in Chicago, 
Illinois; (b) that Grace Catherine Carson was not the widow 
of the deceased and (c) the publishing of notice to creditors 
on June 24th through July 15, 1949, subsequent to the order 
signed by the Court but prior to the entry of Fidings and Con-
clusions for such order. 
2. In doing of the folowing acts as administrator: (a) in 
not publishing a legal notice to heirs or creditors in the es-
·tate; (b) in filing two petitions for a widow's allowance; 
(c) in failing after July 22, -1949, to mail notices to the plain-
tiffs; (d) in failing- to make a diligent search for plaintiffs; 
(e) in failing to inventory certain assets. 
3. In failing to reveal to the Court, (a) that he knew 
plaintiffs were the children of deceased; (b) that Grace Cath-
erine Carson was not the widow; (c) the facts as to what 
search he had made to locate the plaintiffs. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became ap-
parent to the Court and counsel, in view of the authorities 
on this matter and of the circumstances involved, that any 
irregularities in the time of the various orders and actions 
taken by the administrator would not be grounds for setting 
the decree aside for extrinsic fraud. The real claim in this 
action boiled down to the proposition that the administrator 
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had not affirmatively given the location and identity of these 
two children to the Court. This appeared clearly from a dis-
cussion of certain rulings of the Court (R.- 434, 43 5). 
''THE COURT: Let us inquire into this. There seems 
to be a lot of argument. I thought we had settled our 
positions before. 
Mr. Beatie, the basis of your claim here is that the 
decree of distribution, and all proceedings, was based 
on the fraud of the administrator in affirmatively hid-
ing the location and identity of these children. 
J\.fr. Beatie: From the Court. Yes. 
The Court: If you fail in that-
Mr. Beatie: I fail completely. 
The Court: Then your decree is res ad judicata and 
there might have been an injustice but no remedy. 
Mr. Beatie: That is right." 
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, and after the de-
fendants had made their motions to dismiss upon the ground 
that no such proof had been adduced by plaintiffs, the Court 
stated: 
'(Now as I understand it, the administrator is under 
a very great duty to disclose to the court, at the time dis-
tribution is made, all known facts relative to heirship, 
and in those cases where the administrator himself ac-
tually receives, either directly or indirectly, benefits of 
the estate and the heir does not show up, after his 
failure to use reasonable diligence to locate them, does 
constitute what can be considered fraud upon that par-
ticular heir. 
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nWhat do you claim in this case, Mr. Norton knew 
or did affirmatively that constituted the fraud? 
ttDo you clain1 that the evidence shows that he had 
any know ledge of the whereabouts of these children 
that he did not disclose? 
MR. BEATIE: To that question, no." 
It was clearly made to appear by the record, therefore, 
that plaintiffs were forced to abandon any claim based· on 
irregularities in the probate decision. In fact, plaintiffs had 
conceded that the Court had jurisdiction in the probate pro- . 
ceedings (R. 145). It also appears that plaintiffs had aban-
doned their claim that the administrator had failed to disclose 
to the Court any knowledge he had concerning the plaintiffs 
or the rights or position of the widow Grace Catherine Carson. 
While fraud was the entire basis of the right of plaintiff~ to 
recover in this action, both in the pleadings and by the admis-
sion of plaintiffs' counsel during the course of the presenta-
tion of plaintiffs' evidence, and at the conclusion of 
the evidence in direct response to the question, that the 
administrator :ttad not failed to disclose any knowledge he 
had to the Court. The entire basis for fraud was thus aban-
doned by the plaintiffs. 
There remained only the question, then, as to whether 
the administrator, under the complaints and issues, was guilty 
of fraud in not making a further search or in not applying to 
the Court for further instruction after Judge Jeppson had made 
and entered his finding that the only known heir was Grace 
. Catherine Carson, and having further found that Grace Cath-
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thine Carson was the widow of the deceased. In this connec4 
tion, it must be recalled that there had been a very hotly con· 
tested series of court proceedings extending over a period 
in excess of nine months concerning directly the question as 
to whether there were children, as to their existence, their 
probable location and also as to the validity of the position 
of Grace Catherine Carson as the widow of the deceased. 
In connection with this point Judge Lewis stated (R. 
151): 
no£ course, in looking in retrospect that is what 
should have been done." (Making of an application 
to the court for direction as to whether there should 
be a further search.) There is no question about that. 
These children are here at this stage of the proceed· 
ings. Of course, as the case goes forward they may 
have some evidence to the contrary. At this. stage of 
the proceeding it is ut:Idoubtedly true that the court 
at that time abused its discretion in closing the estate, 
but the remedy for that was an appeal at that time. 
If he just made an error in judgment, that is just too 
bad. 
Mr. Beatie: That is right." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE OF A 
DECEASED~ PERSON IS AN ACTION IN REM AND 
AFTER THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY LAW THE PRO· 
CEEDING IS BINDING UPON ALL THE WORLD AND 
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UPON 1\LL PERSONS HAVING AN\" CLAIM IN THE 
ESTATE. 
POINT NO. II 
i\. DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN A PROBATE PRO-
CEEDING IS A FINAL DETERMINATION, SUBJECT TO 
ATTACK ONLY IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING FOR EX-
TRINSIC FRAUD. 
POINT NO. III 
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATOR NOR THE SUR-
ETY CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR A MISTAKE OF JUDG-
MENT IN A DECREE OF THE COURT. 
POINT NO. IV 
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF EXTRINSIC FRA-UD 
IN THE CASE AT BAR. · 
POINT NO. V 
THERE WAS NO PROOF IN THE CASE AT BAR 
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD INFER THAT 
LOREN G. NORTON, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTl1.TE OF CHARLES CARSON, DID NOT EXERCISE 
THE CARE AND PRUDENCE OF A REASONABLY PRU-
DENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH RESPECT TO THE 
MATTER OF GIVING NOTICES AND MAKING ANY 
SEARCH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ESTATE OF A 
DECEASED PERSON IS AN ACTION IN REM AND 
AFTER THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY LAW THE PRO-
CEEDING IS BINDING U-PON ALL THE WORLD AND 
UPON ALL PERSONS HAVING ANY CLAIM IN THE 
ESTATE. 
In Snyder v. Murdock, 26 Utah 233, 73 Pac. 22 (1903) 
the Court stated, quoting a California case: 
''By filing the petition for the distribution of the 
estate and giving the notice required by Section 1665, 
Code Civil Procedure, the Superior Court acquired 
jurisdiction to distribute the estate 'among the persons 
who by law were entitled thereto.' The 'distribution' 
of an estate includes the determination of the persons 
who by law are entitled thereto, and also the (propor-
tions or parts' to which each of these persons is en-
titled; * * * * A probate for distribution is in the 
nature of a proceeding in rem, the res being 
the estate which is in the hands of the executor 
under the control of the court, and which he 
brings before the court for the purpose of receiving 
directions as to its final disposition. By giving the 
notice directed by the statute, the entire world is called 
before the court, and the court acquires jurisdiction 
over all persons for the purpose of determining their . 
rights to any portion of- the estate; and every person 
who may assert any right or claim therein is required 
to present his claim to the court for its determination. 
Whether he appear and present his claim, or fail to 
appear, the action of the court is equally conclusive 
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upon him, subject only to be reversed, set aside or 
modified on appeal. A decree is just as binding upon 
him if he fail to appear and present his claim as if 
his claim, after presentation, had been disallowed 
by the court." 
In the case at bar it \vas stipulated repeatedly that the 
Court in the Estate of Charles Carson, et al., acquired juris-
diction; that notices of the hearing of the petition for letters 
of administration had been -given by mailing and posting, as 
required by Section 102-2-8, U.C.A. 1943. 
In the case of Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 
522 ( 1909), the Supreme Cnurt of Utah held that this original 
notice is the only notice in the proceeding that is jurisdictional. 
((The whole question, therefore, hinges upon V{hether 
notice of .the hearing on the application for distribution 
is essential to give the court jurisdiction. * * * From 
the provisions contained in Section 3 779 (( (identical 
with Sec. 102-2-7, Utah Code Ann. 1943) * * * 
'(probate proceedings are deemed to be proceedings 
in rem and that the court acquires jusisdiction of the 
res-that is-the property of the estate- and all of 
the persons who have or claim to have any interest 
in the property by the notice required to be given 
for the appointment of an administrator or executor 
as the case may be. * * * All other notices provided 
for, however important they may be, in certain cases 
and under certain circumstances, are, nevertheless, not 
jurisdictional. * * * When the notice for the appoint-
ment of an administrator was given as required by 
statute, we think that- the effect of such notice was 
to bring all the parties who have or acquired any in-
terest in the estate into court. * * * We think the 
more reasonable and safer doctrine is that, when the 
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statutory notice that an administrator will be appointed 
is given, such a notice not only is notice to the parties 
of the fact, but is notice to all the world, that the 
court, by the appointment of an administrator, will 
take charge of the property of the deceased to adminis-
ter it, and that it will finally distribute the remainder, 
if any, to the heirs of the deceased." 
.. 
The Court in the Barrette case, supra, held that although 
notice had not been given of the hearing on the petition for 
distribution, the proper notice had been given of the petition 
for the appointment of an administrator, and such notice was 
conclusive on all the world. The decree distributing real 
property of the estate conveyed good and marketable title, and 
the purchaser could not object to. the failure to give notice 
of the petition for final distribution of the estate. 
These Utah cases state, it is submitted, the universal view 
upon the effect of administration of the estate of a deceased. 
In the estate of Charles Carson, deceased, there were ac-
tually three petitions filed praying for letters of administration. 
The petition of Dr. Howard T. Anderson was filed the day be-
fore the funeral, October 11, 1948. Notices of this petition 
and the hearing thereof were sent by the deputy county clerk 
on the 16th day of October, 1948, to Grace Catherine Sweeney 
Carson, 2300 South State Street, Salt Lake County, Utah; R. 
V. Swann, Chicago, Illinois; Mrs. Mildred Swann Molinari, 
4i- Chicago, Illinois. Copies of the notice were deposited in the 
United States Post Office in Salt Lake City, postage prepaid, 
to the individuals named (Ex. L-1). Subsequently, in the 
course of the various hearings in the estate, a petition was 
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filed by D. L. O'Donnell on the 14th day of April, 1949. 
Notices of this petition and the hearing thereon were sent 
on the 16th day of April, 1949, nby depositing the ·same in 
the U. S. Post Office in Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid, 
. to the follo"ring named persons and addresses, to-wit: R. 
V. Swann, Chicago,· Illinois; Mildred Swann Molinari, Chi-· 
cago, Illinois, (Ex. 19). This case was consolidated with 
the petitions_by Mrs. Carson and Dr. Anderson for hearing. 
It thus appears that the only jurisdictional notice re-
quired by the Utah statute was given to the plaintiffs in this 
action. It is true. that the notices were sent by the clerk at the 
instance _of petitioners other than Mrs. Carson. The fact 
remains,. nevertheless, that the petitions were all consolidated 
for hearing and the Court did obtain jurisdiction by the giving 
of these notices. 
Plaintiffs in this action, as heretofore stated, stipulated 
on several occasions that the Court obtained jurisdiction in 
the probate of the Charles Carson estate. Certainly the mail-
ing of notice to the two plaintiffs under the only names by 
which they were known by any of the parties to the probate 
proceeding, and to the only addresses which were ~nown to 
any of the parties, would not have reached them at any time 
ino 1949 or 1948. The fact that the notices apparently did 
not reach the plaintiffs is, of course, immaterial in determin-
ing 'Yhether the Court obtained jurisdiction of the res and 
of the plaintiffs insofar as the probate of the estate is con-
cerned. 
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POINT NO. II 
A DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN A PROBATE PRO-
CEEDING IS A FINAL DETERMINATION, SUBJECT TO 
ATrACK ONLY IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING .FOR EX-
TRINSIC FRAUD. 
Benson v. Anderson, 10 Utah 135; 37 Pac. 256, appears 
to be the first case in Utah where the question of extrinsic . 
. fraud was involved. In that case the plaintiff was an .elderly 
Danish woman who had virtually no knowledge of the English 
language. She had full and ·complete notice of all the pro-
bate proceed~ngs in her husband's estate, but it appeared that 
she had depended wholly upon others for information as to 
her rights, and she had been misled and defrauded by such 
other persons in their representations to her. The Court stated: 
' ' ' 
''We do not intend to declare that a party . to a 
probate proceeding may sit by when an erroneous 
decree is entered against him, and negligent! y permit 
the time for appeal to expire, arid depend on a bill in· 
equity to correct it. But in this case sufficient excuse 
is shown for the failure to appeal, and no such neglect 
is shown in this case a sought to deprive the plaintiff 
of relief." · 
A similar factual situation was presented by the case of 
Rice v. Rice, 212 Pac. ( 2d) 685; 182 Pac. ( 2d) 111. In 
this. case an heir of an estate attempted to set aside a decree 
of the probate court ~hich had been obtained by misrepre-
sentation of the executrix to the heir as to the property being . 
distributed to the heir. The Court held that where the. execu-
trix assured the. plaintiff· that he would get· a certain property 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and then distributed the property otherwise in the court pro-
ceeding, the. heir had been deprived by such act of his day 
in court, and the executrix had been guilty of extrinsic fraud 
sufficient to justify the intervention of a court of equity. 
Weyant rs. Utah SavingJ & Trust Company, 54 Utah, . 
181; 182 Pac. 189, presented a situation where the deceased 
abandoned his family in the East and eloped with a seventeen-
year old girl to Salt Lake City, where he made his· home. 
He was known at his new address for many years as ((Fuller. n 
On his death the woman with whom he eloped probated his 
estate under the name ((Fuller" without revealing the fact 
that she was never married to him, and without revealing 
his true widow or his children, all of which was fully known . 
to her. The girl fraudulently represented to the Court that 
she was the widow and in addition she concealed approxi-
mately $12,000 of assets which had belonged to the deceased 
and should have been inventoried. 
The Court announced the following legal principles: 
(( 1. Probate proceedings are in rem, and _where the 
statutory notice has been given, all who are interested 
in the estate are bound by all orders or decrees duly 
entered in a particular case, and that ordinarily is the 
only remedy is by direct appeal. 
( (2. Judgments and decrees entered by courts of 
competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction of the sub-
ject of the action and of the person -has been legally 
acquired, can only. be assailed o_n _dire~t appeal or _in 
equity for exttinstc . as contradtsttngutshed from tn-
trinsic fraud." 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is significant in the Weyant case that the family had 
spent considerable money in an attempt to locate their father, 
Weyant, and the court found that they had been fraudulently 
misled by the knowing and false representations made. to the 
court in the petition and testimony of the M<:>rgan woman. 
Where the administrator knowingly causes a false and fic-
titious notice to be published, the Court held that such an 
·act amounted to extrinsic fraud and that a .court of equity 
would grant relief. 
Anderson v. State, 65 Utah, 512, 238 Pac. 557 and Cani-
. well v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47. Utah, 150; 151 
Pac. 986, are authorities for the proposition that anything less 
than extrinsic fraud will not justify the· intervention of an 
equity court. 
In the Anderson case an attempt was· made to set aside 
an adverse judgment in bastardy proceedings. upon the ground 
that the judgment was procured by the perjured testimony of 
the woman and her mother in the case. In refusing to set the 
. . ' . 
judgment aside, the Court announced this. doctrine: 
. ttFirst, the fraud relied upon must be extrinsic, but 
not fraud which could have been apprehended in the 
trial of the case which resulted in the judgment com-
plained of; second, it sh.ould appear to the satisfaction 
of th~ equity tr~l?unal that had· it not been for the 
fraud the judgment would not have been rendered; 
third, the fraud, and the. effect thereof, should be made 
to appear heyo.t;J.d a reasonable doubt; and, fourth, 
. the parties seeking the relief must have been free from 
negligence of the case in which the judgment was 
rendered.'' 
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In the Cdnt ttcll case plaintiff sought to set aside a decree 
which ~'as based upon alleged perjured testimony of the 
president of the bank. The Court held that if the witness 
committed perjury, the perjury related directly to the subject 
matter involved in the detern1ination of the Court in the 
former proceeding. 
ttl£ we assume, therefore, that the perjury consti-
tuted a fraud against the plaintiff, yet it was fraud 
which directly arose out of the matter litigated in 
the prior action, the case, therefore, clearly is not one 
where ~orne alleged fraud was committed which pre-
vented the plaintiff from fully presenting his case, or 
where he was deceived or misled, and for those rea-
sons did not make out a case or present his defense, 
as the case may be, but the alleged fraud-that is the 
perjury-was committed with respect to the things 
litigated and which the court adjudicated in the former 
action. Under such circumstances the great weight of 
authority is to the effect that a court of equity is not 
authorized to grant relief.H 
The judgment of the district court denying relief to Cant-
well was affirmed. 
It seems appropriate to invite the Court's attention at 
this time to the fact that plaintiff's counsel at various stages 
of. the proceeding stated in no uncertain terms that he knew· 
he would have to prove extrinsic fraud if relief was to be 
obtained in the case at bar. In the course of a discussion as 
to certain rulings ot the Court the Court stated: 
HLet us inquire into this. There seems to be a lot 
of argument. I thought we had settled our positions 
before. 
""1 )_ 
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~~Mr. Beatie, the basis of your claim· fhere is the 
decree of distribution, and all proceedings was based 
o~ .the fraud ~f the administrator in affirmatively 
htdtng the locatlon and identity of these children. 
Mr. Beatie: I fail completely. 
The Court: If you fail in that-
Mr. Beatie: From the court; yes. 
The Court: Then your decree is res adjudicata, and 
there might have been an injustice but no remedy. 
Mr. Beatie: That is right." (R. 434, 43·5). 
The trial of the case at bar was supposedly directed to 
the proof of such fraud. Plaintiffs, well knew and stated to 
the Court .that extrinsic fraud was the nub of their contention. 
That extrinsic fraud must be shown in an action of this 
kind is well settled by cases in other jurisdictions. The basic 
doctrine of the lJtah cases is founded upon United States v. 
Throckmorton} 98 U.S. 61; 25 L. Ed. 93. That case was a land 
title action to set aside a judgment twenty years after it had 
been entered. The court confirmed the sanctity of judgments 
and the fundamental princi pies to set litigation at rest once 
ther~ had been ~ determination, and then sets forth the follow-
ing circumstances under which relief from a judgment may 
be granted in equity: 
... where, by reason of something done by the sue-
. cessful party to· a suit, there was, in fact, no adversary 
trial or decisiop. of the issue of the ca.se. Where the 
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting 
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fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him 
by his opponent, as by keeping him a'vay from court, 
a false promise of a compromise; or where the de· 
fendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept 
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an 
attorney fraudulently or 'vithout authority assumes 
to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or 
\\·here the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells 
out his clienf s interest . . . " 
The Court stated as a qualification to the foregoing rule: 
t]n all these cases and many others which have been 
examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that, 
by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seek-
ing relief against the judgment or decree, that party 
has been prevented from presenting all of his case to 
the court. 
* * * ttequity will not go behind the judgment to 
interpose in the case itself, but only when there was 
some hindrance besides the negligence ·of the de-
fendant, in presenting the defense in the legal ac-
tion. * * * 
ctNew matter may in· some bases be ground for relief; 
but it must not be what was tried before." 
POINT NO. III 
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATOR NOR THE SUR-
ETY CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR A MISTAKE OF JUDG-
MENT IN A DECREE OF THE COURT. 
Appellants. infer in their brief that the Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree in the Charles Carson Estate, whereby 
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the Court determined that Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson 
was ~he sole surViving heir of Char!~s Carson, deceased, was 
. if 
erroneous, and that the Court should not have made such a · 
decree at that stage in the proceedings. 
It will be recalled that up until the time this oral decree 
vvas first made on or about June 11,. 1949, and the written 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree were signed on or about 
July, 22 1949 (Ex. L-1), the questions before the Court were 
vvith reference to the granting of petitions for letters of ad-
mtntstration. Questions of heirship and widowhood were 
necessarily involved in that proceeding because of t~eir bear-
ing upon the priority in the appointment of an administrator. 
We do n~t concede that any error or mistake in judgment was 
made on the· part of the District Court in connection with. the 
tnaking of this order or any other in the Charles Carson 
Estate. In view of counsel's. inferences, however, it is sug-
gested to ·the Court that even if som·e error ·or irregularity 
occurred, neither the adrilin.istrator nor his bondsmen can be 
liable for it in the .subsequent suit which atten1pts in effect to 
declare that the administrator is guilty of extrinsic fraud. 
Section 102-1-7, U.C.A., 1943~,. provides as follows: 
((No order or decree affecting the title to real prop-
erty, heretofore or. hereafter made in any probate or 
guardianship matter, shall be held to be void at. the 
suit . or instance of any person claiming adversely to 
the title of the decedent or ward, or under a title not 
derived from or through the decedent or v1ard, on. ac-
count of any want of notice, defect or irregularity in 
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the proceedings, or of any defect or irregularity in such 
order or decree, if it appears that, before the order 
or decree \Yas entered, the executor, administrator or 
guardian, as the case may be, \vas appointed by a court 
of cotnpetent jurisdiction upon such notice as was or 
may be prescribed by law; and in a probate matter 
in \Yhich a competent court shall have appointed an 
executor, administrator or guardian upon due notice, 
no objection to any subsequent order or decree therein 
can be taken by any person claiming under the deceased 
or under the ward, on account of any such want of 
notice, defect or irregt~larity, ·in any other manner 
than on direct application to the same court, made at 
any time before distribution or on appeal." 
In Cook v. Ringer, 244 N.W. 615, (Sup. Ct. Wis., 1932), 
it appeared that the probate judge had received a letter at 
the time of the hearing on the question of distribution, in 
\vhich a claim was made· that there were living children of 
the administrator-apparently brothers and sisters of deceased 
-who were entitled to share in the estate. The father of the 
deceased and administrator of the estate represented to the 
Court that he was the sole surviving heir and entitled to re-
ceive all of the estate. The probate judge decreed that the 
estate should be distributed to the administrator and father. 
The plaintiffs brought an action to set aside the finding 
and decree and to recover against the bondsmen on the theory 
that the bondsmen were liable for a wrongful distribution. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the testimony 
of the administrator that he was the sole heir was not ex-
trinsic fraud and that the representation to the Court was a 
tnixed question of law and fact. The conclusion of the pro-
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bate judge was undoubtedly erroneous but his error in judg-
nlent was not because of the failure of the. administrator to 
disclose all facts in the administrator's possession. The probate 
~udge had all the knowledge of the. claims of purported heirs, 
as did the administrator: 
~~Consequently, as no fraud was committed by any 
person in connection with the entry of the final decree 
on October 21, 1930, it cannot be held that that de-
cree was procure4 by fraud, or that it could be. set 
aside because of fraud. That being true, the actu.al 
payment by Herman Ringer as administrator to him-
self in his individual capacity, pursuant to, and in 
compliance with, that · ~nal decree, and while it was 
in force and effect, constituted proper performance on 
his part under the Court's order and judgment, and 
was therefore in full compliance with, and not a breach 
of, the administrator's bond. * * * That consequence 
followed even though the payment was made by Ringer 
in his representative capacity to himself in his indi-
vidual capacity." 
This case held: 
1 .. Representation of the administrator ·that he was the 
sole heir in a petition for distribution was not fraud. 
2. The administrator performed properly under the de-· 
cree, awarding the proceeds of the estate to himself, even 
. though the .administrator knew of the existence of the brothers 
and sisters of the deceased. 
. . 
3. The mistake in law of a probate .judge could not be 
itnputed to the administrator. 
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4. There \Yas no liability on the bond because of an error 
in judgment by the probate court. 
In the case at bar it is undisputed that from the time 
of the filing of the first petition on October 11, 1948, until 
the time the Court made its determination in the matter, 
June 11, 1949, everyone "rho had taken any interest_ whatever 
in the proceeding knew that there was a claim made that de-
ceased had t\\'O children whose last known address was Chi-
cago, Illinois. There was also a claim made that Grace Cath-
erine Sweeney Carson was not the lawful wife of Charles 
Carson. 
All the facts which could be assembled and presented to 
the Court concerning these claims were diligently presented 
by the special administrator and his counsel. Hearings were 
held ~n these very questions on November 26, 1948, Decem-
ber 8,_ 1948, January 19, 1949, January 26, 1949, February 
23, 1949, February 26, 1949, March 25, -1949, May 23, 1949, 
and June 11, 1949 (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 147). At 
these hearings the efforts that had been made to locate the 
purported two children were made apparent in great de-
tail. Sixty to seventy letters were sent to various individuals 
and agencies in an effort to find plaintiffs. 
The Court found in the instant case that the search in-
cluded contacting by mail and by telephone all known rela-
tives and friends of deceased in West Virginia, Ohio, Illinois 
and South Dakota. Inquiries were directed to chiefs of police 
at Chicago and Omaha, Nebraska, and inquiries were made 
in medical schools in and around Chicago, because of the be-
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lief that Mrs. Molinari had a son attending one of these schools 
(Finding of Fact No. 8; R. 146). The special administrator, 
through his trust officer and attorney, inquired into the marital 
status of the deceased at great length and reported the results 
of these investigations to the Court. 
Attorneys for the special administrator were paid $5 50.00 
for their services; the special administrator was awarded 
$150.96 for expenses in the search, and $100.00 was allowed 
to Lawrence Barclay for his services in connection with his 
search at the request of the deceased of the alleged children. 
At the conclusion of all of this testimony, rightly or 
wrongly, the probate judge made and entered an order in 
which it was stated that Grace Catherine Carson with the sur-
viving wife of Charles c·arson and the only known heir at 
law of Charles Carson (Ex. L-1; see Findings, Decree and 
order signed July 22, 1949). All ~f the· proceedings and 
all of the evidence that was before the Court at the time 
this order was entered were before the Court and a part of the 
probate file at all other hearings and determinations made by 
the Court to the completion of the proceeding. 
How can it now be contended that an administrator who 
was admittedly not trained in the law, who had to rely upon 
his counsel as to the meaning of the orders of the Court and 
their significance and the proper procedure in probate matters 
(R. 616, 617), should be held legally liable because it is 
now inferred that the Court's order was improper? Norton 
was a party to the proceeding up until June 11, 1949; he 
was a petitioner for letters of administration, and was making 
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cert~in contentions and asking for certain relief in connection 
\\'ith that petition. l-Ie properly relied upon the dete~mination 
of that date to the effect that he was a successful litigant. Cer-
tainly there is nothing wrong or extraordinary about his ac-
tivities up to that time. Certainly now he cannot be charged 
with b~d faith or held liable on the theory that the Court 
should not have granted him the relief prayed for. 
Nor was the situation any different in this respect at 
any subsequent hearing. The probate files are considered by 
the lavt as a notice to all the world of their contents. C·ertainly 
this Court does not wish to announce the doctrine that the 
probate judges themselves, who sit upon the very matters 
presented to them by the various petitions and other plead-
ings, do not have notice of the contents of these files~ 
It is submitted that the most that can be said about the. 
Charles Carson Estate proceedings is that there is a possi-
bility Judge Jeppson made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law more broad than was necessitated by the demands of 
the pleadings at that time. This, however, is at most a mere 
irregularity in the pro~ee~ings. . It is certainly not jurisric-
tional, and it is. certainly not an irregularity for which the 
administrator or his bondsmen should be made liable in 
damages in this proceeding. 
POINT NO. IV 
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF EXTRINSIC FRAl_TD 
IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
The amended complaint and the second amended com-
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plaint filed by plaintiffs in this action specify fraud on the 
part of Norton in the following particulars: 
A. That at the time Mrs. Carson filed her petition for 
letters of administration Norton knew that the plaintiffs in 
this action were the children ·of the deceased and t t to his best 
information resided in Chicago, Illinois." 
B. Th~t Mrs. Carson was not the widow of Charles Carson. 
C. That the notice to creditors was improper, having been 
given prior to the qualification of the administrator. 
D. That no legal notice to the heirs or creditors was 
published. 
E. That the widow's allowance petitions were false. 
F. That no. notices were mailed to plaintiffs after July 
22, 1949. 
G. That no diligent search was made to locate the plain-
tiffs. Ill IJ-.,_. 
H. That· $300.00 which he owed the estate was not in-
ventoried or was improperly inventoried. 
I. That he knew prior to the de~th of Mrs. Carson that 
the plaintiffs were the children of the deceased and were· his 
heirs. 
J. That Mrs. Carson was not the widow. 
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K. That Norton kne,,· of the claim made by other par-
ties to the probate proceeding to the etiect that there were 
children and that despite such know ledge he did not disclose 
to the court the probability of the existence of heirs and that 
he had ulterior motives for so acting (R. 31-32, par. 11, R. 
80-82, par. 12). 
At the close of plaintiffs, evidence, the various defend-
ants submitted their motions to dismiss the complaints and 
action, and the court had occasion to further clarify the po-
sition of Mr. Beatie with respect to his claims in the case 
and what he considered that the evidence showed. The court· 
stated: 
CCMr. Beatie, the court is of the opinion you have 
undoubtedly made a prima facie showing that the 
plaintiffs are in fact the son and daughter of H. F. 
Swann and that H. F. Swann is. the same person as 
Carson, who died here, and that had the two children 
been located or had appeared at the original probate 
they would have received a share of the estate. Your 
evidence is sufficient in that regard, and, of course, 
the evidence is clear that they did not receive it. They 
v;ere living in Chicago, apparently, under your evi-
dence, at the time of the proceedings, 1:1nder the name 
of Tillier and Molinari. The Molinari name was known-
at that time. 
Now your case, as I understand it, has been based 
upon the claim that Mr. Norton, as administrator, was 
guilty of fraud, allowing a distribution of the estate 
under the circumstances that the evidence discloses here. 
Now, as I understand it, the administrator is under 
a yery great duty to disclose to the court, at the time 
distribution is made, all known facts relative to heir-
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ship, and in those cases where the administrator him-
self actually receives, either directly or indirectly, the 
benefits of the estate when the heir doesn't show up, 
that his failure to use reasonable diligence to locate 
them does constitute, or can be considered a fraud 
upon that particular heir. 
What do you claim in this case Mr. Norton knew, 
or did affirmatively, that constituted a fraud? 
Do you claim that the evidence shows that he had 
any knowledge of the whereabouts of these children, 
that he did not disclose?" 
Mr. Beatie: To that question, no. 
The Court: Do you claim that he .did anything af-
firmatively to prevent the discovery of the whereabouts 
of these children ? 
Mr. Beatie: Yes, with reference to that. An affirm-
ative act which is negatively operated . in failing to 
make any investigation by which he. could inform the 
court the result of his investigation. 
The Court: He answered and testified here that he 
did nothing, after he was appointed administrator, af-
firmatively, to locate these children; that he knew of 
the prior inquiries. of yourself and Tracy's; and the 
effect of his testimony was that, at least as I interpreted 
it, that he believed he could do nothing further. 
Mr. Beatie: That is correct. 
The Court: It is your position, isn't it, it was. his 
duty to do something further, and, in the absence of 
doing it, that constituted fraud? What should he 
have done? 
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Mr. Beatie: He should have at least made some in-
dependent investigation upon ~is own. 
He should have, during the lifetime of Mrs. Carson, 
determined what she knew with reference to it; she 
being the prime mover by which he became adminis-
trator of the estate, to determine from her actually 
whether she knew anything with reference to these 
children. · 
The Court: Is there any evidence ·.to the effect he 
did not do that, that he didn't make inquiry from 
~rs. Carson; or is there any evidence to show if he 
had made inquiry from Mrs. Carson, it would have 
done any good? 
Mr. Beatie: No direct evidence, Your Honor. It all 
has to be inferred evidence, at least as we adopted the 
petitions have been filed by both he . and Mrs. Carson 
with reference to (~ases 30762 and 30771. Those are 
the two, No. 30761 and 30762 ~ . · . 
. The Court: My question was whether he had done 
anything affirmatively, to prevent discovery. ThaJ~ of 
course, would constitute a fraud, if he did anything 
like that. 
Is there anything else in regard to the actions of 
Mr. Norton that you claim constituted fraud, except 
his failure to make any in<)uiry under the circumstances? 
Mr. Beatie: Yes. I claim this: That Mrs. Carson, 
having knowledge of the fact at the time of the filing 
of her petition, was under the duty, under the stat~te, 
to disclose to the court the names of any known hetrs, 
which she has not done in anywise; that in ·conjunction 
with the appointment of Mr. Norton as her appointee, 
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that he failed in his duty to then further require an 
amendment to my petition, to inform the court that 
there might be heirs, and ask then that money be desig-
nated from the estate to make such search or to dis-
close to the court what search he had made; in which 
event the court, undoubted! y-· as I will be able to show 
by cases-. undoubtedly would have made such an order. 
* * * * * 
The Court: Of course, in looking it?- retrospect that 
is what should have been done. There is no question 
about that. 1·hese children are here at this stage of 
the proceedings. Of course, as the case goes forward 
they may have some evidence to the contrary. At this 
stage of the proceedings it is undoubtedly. true that 
that court at that time abused its discretion, in closing 
the estate. But the remedy for that was an appeal at 
that time. If he just made an error in judgment, that 
is just too bad. 
Mr. Beatie: That is right." 
The court then pointed out that the only way relief could 
be granted is by showing fraud (R .. 75 3-756). 
The court then asked Mr. Beatie: 
((Assuming that you have shown a prima facie case 
of fraud, what do you claim relative to this no marriage 
betWeen the Carsons? Isn't that just a bunch of infer-
ences ? The burden is on you to establish now and 
negative it.· There is a finding that they were married. 
Have you done anything except give me some infor-
mation· from which I may have a suspicion? Is there 
anything I can . base a finding on ? 
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Mr. Beatie: Yes. 
The Court: What? 
Mr. Beatie:· The exhibit which is an exemplified 
certified copy of the divorce decree as between Maydie 
Tiller and R. C. Tiller, in December·. of 1924, at Chi-
cago. That is the -point at which there would be no 
liability, no further liability upon Mr. Tiller to enter 
into a marriage contract." (R. 756). 
The court was then advised in further detail that the plaintiffs 
relied upon an aleged deposition in the Charles Carson es-
tate in which Mrs. Carson supposedly stated that she had 
been married to Mr. Carson from 25 to 35 years before 
the taking of her deposition. The plaintiffs' position was that 
as a matter _ of mathematical _ deduction she could not have 
been married that long because Mr. Tiller was under a disa-
bility since the divorce from Mrs. Tiller was not complete at 
that time (R. 756-758). 
To . be successful, the plaintiffs' proof of fraud in this 
action must rise to an exacting standard: · The defendant 
Norton must have known of the existence of other heirs and 
for the purpose of defrauding such heirs and benefitting him-
. self must have .f~iled to notify the Court of the existence of 
such heirs, and must have knowingly filed false petitions with 
the court, representing that there were no such heirs. In such 
a case he would be guilty of extrinsic fraud. See _Hewett et al. 
vs. Linstead et al.~ 122 Pac. (2d) 355 (D.C. of App. 1st Dis., 
Div. 1, Cal. 1942) and cases cited. The Court stated in this 
case that a different rule would be nin effect to hold that an 
administratrix is under a positive. duty at her peril to discover 
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the existence of possible heirs of whose existence she has no 
reason or ground to respect." As to determination of widow-
hood of Grace Catherine Carson, plaintiffs in this action have 
the burden of overcoming the presumption of the lawfulness 
and validity of ~he second marriage .as this Court has recently 
passed upon that subject in H. E. Anderson v. Alvira Magda-
line Anderson, No. 7693, decided ____ . ____________________ ,____________ Pac. 
( 2d) ----· The plaintiffs' proof does not even begin to approach 
these standards. 
Plaintiffs' cases, which are quoted in their brief, are 
not in point to the facts of this case. There is no case which 
plaintiffs cite,. and we submit no case in existence which holds 
that an administrator owes any duty to disclose to the court 
that which· the court already knows.. When a court gets· a 
probate file in which it appears . from the file itself that 
there has been a long standing dispute as to questions of heir-
ship and whether a woman is the surviving widow and a de-
termination is made. on those questions, it certainly can 
hardly be contended that the administrator has to disclose 
the fact of the controversies in the petition which he files ·to 
the court which has determined these matters. That is pre-
cisely what the plaintiffs cQntend in this case·. 
The cases which. they cite are not relevant to the factual 
situation. The case at bar is distinguished, and should be dis-
tinguished from the cases cited by plaintiffs and appellants in 
this respect: In the case at bar the administrator disclosed 
all the facts in his possession to the court at ·all times and 
findings, conclusions and decree were made, wherein the court 
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found that Grace Catherine Carson was the sole surviving heir 
and the widow of the deceased. Before that time, the ad-
ministrator was one of several persons presenting adverse 
claims to the court. At no time did the administrator make any 
statements of fact or representations to the effect that there 
were no heirs. Norton has simply stood by while the other 
parties to the law suit attempted to convince the court that 
there were heirs and that Mrs. Carson was not the widow. 
Norton had knowledge of all of the claims made to that 
time. Neither he nor Mrs. Carson made objections to the 
proceedings or hindered the efforts made to locate the heirs. 
The court then made its order that Mrs. Carson was the widow 
and there were no other known. heirs. Norton's counsel, as 
well as Norton, presented no petitions to the court contrary 
to this determination. Norton's counsel incorporated the find-
ings of the court into written form and the court adopted 
them. The effect of this proceeding was the determination 
of heirship under the Utah Statute. It bound all parties to 
the proceeding. It was accomplished in conformity with the 
provisions of the Utah Statute relating to this very subject. 
True, it may have been that the court did not have to find 
and determine that Mrs. Carson was the sole surviving heir_ 
at that time, but in view of the contentions made as to pur-
ported children, the court did, nevertheless, make that find-
ing and conclusion, and at subsequent stages of the proceeding 
this determination was reiterated. Now, the question in this 
case is whether without any new or different knowledge of 
plaintiffs, the administrator, having adopted the finding of 
the court in the contested matters in his subsequent peti-
tion, was guilty of any extrinsic fraud. Certainly, the 
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cases cited by the appellants do not sustain the position that 
he was. Let~ us examine appellants' case with reference to 
this proposition .. ·Let us first consider the Utah cases ap-
pellants cite. 
In re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Ut. 72, .197 Pac. 2d 143;, ( 1948), 
is cited by appellants at page 44 of their brief. In this case, 
the deceased married Mabel Vaughn Pilcher in Lyon County, 
Kansas in 1901. They lived as husband and wife for several 
years in Kansas where six cildren were born, four of whom 
were living at the time of the trial. These parties separated 
in 1925. Thereafter the parties were in contact with each 
other to some extent, according to Mabel Vaughn Pilcher, 
on cross examination, and he . told her that he had 
divorced her. In 1926, apparently in reliance upon the state-
ments of deceased, Mabel Vaughn Pilcher began living with 
one Hal F. Showers, ostensibly as his wife, although she 
denied at the trial thaf she was his wife. The decedent and 
Mildred Pilcher were married on June 26, 1941, at Logan. 
Mildred \vas 19 and he was 59 at the time. Mildred testified 
that he told her he had not been married but she discovered 
his · prior marriage about a month after their marriage and 
she was assured that he had obtained a divorce. Thereafter, 
for some time, Mildred· and the deceased lived in California 
as husband and wife. There was testimony that the deceased 
had told Mabel Vaughn Pilcher, while he was tiving with 
Mildred in California; that he had not divorced her. When 
Pilcher died, Mildred filed a petition for and was granted 
letters of administration. During the course of administration, 
Lee Brown, who was the son of Mabel and William Pilcher, 
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came to Mildred purporting to represent all the children of 
Mabel and William and insisted upon a settlement with her 
on behalf of the children. Mildred paid to him the sum of 
$3,000 and certain personal property belonging to the de-
ceased. lvfildred proceeded to administer the estate and no-
tices were sent to the named heirs. Thereafter, Mabel filed 
an ttobjection to final account in petition for distribution" 
and also served and filed a ttpetition for removal of admin-
istratrix and for letters of administration.'' The lower court 
found for the contestant and by its decree revoked and can-
celled letters that had been issued to Mildred. She prosecuted 
the appeal. The court set aside the judgment of the lower 
court and remanded the case on the theory th~t the contestant 
below did not prove with clear and convincing evidence that 
the second marriage was invalid and the first divorce of no 
effect. The court cited opinions from a number of jurisdic-
tions to the effect that the second marriage is clothed with 
every presumption of validity and that the law presumes 
innocence, not guilt, morality, .not· immorality, marriage, not 
concubinage. 
This Court has very recently added weight to the 
already established proposition that the second marriage is 
clearly presumed to be valid. H. A. Anderson v. Elvira Magda-
line Anderson, No. 7693, ____ P 2d ----a It appears that the 
respondent in that case attacked their marriage there with the 
same kind of evidence relied upon by appellants here. 
Mr. Justice Wade wrote a separate concurring opinion. in 
the Pilcher case, supra, in which he discussed in detail the sig-
nificance of the presumption that the marriage was valid. He 
concluded: 
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((In other words, it it judicially deemed socially de-
sirable that ·where a marriage ceremony consummated 
by cohabitation is shown, an innocent person shall not 
be branded as having lived in unlawful cohabitation 
or ~nnocent children be branded as illegitimate, even 
though if the truth were proved, such would be the 
case. To avoid such hardships on innocent persons 
the courts have created a barrier against such results 
by creating a presumption in favor of a lawful mar-
riage, which presumption is not overcome by satis-
fying the o~dinary burden of persuasion. Such a pre-
sumption persists until it is overcome by clear, convinc-
ing and conclusive evidence. See aut~orities quoted 
in the main opiinon. I agree that such is the correct 
policy of the law." (Emphasis by the court). (See par-
ticularly Pages 153, 154, Pacific Reporter.) 
It is difficult to see that plaintiffs and appellants are 
benefitted 9Y this opinion. The necessity of disproving or 
overcoming the presumption .. of legitimacy of marriage is 
emphatically upheld. In the case at bar it is submitted that 
this presumption was not met even if the question of widow-
hood was not res adjudicata in the probate proceeding. Cer-
tainly the Pilchers Estate does not add any force to the propo-
sition that Norton and/ or Mrs. Carson were guilty of fraud 
in the Charles Carson estate. 
In Rice v. Rice, ____ Utah ____ , ~12 Pac. (2d) 685, (1949) 
an executor not only misconstrued the amount of a legacy and 
the construction of a will . to the court in her petition for dis-
tribution, but also the executrix denied to her brother the op-
portunjty of a hearing on a matter which the court said that 
she must have known to have been in dispute~ The Court 
held that under the circumstances of the case, in view of the 
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dispute v.rhich the executrix knew would exist if her inter-
pretation of the 'vill \vas correct, the affirmative lack of 
candor in presenting the matter for the determination of the 
Court constituted extrinsic fraud., 
In the case at bar the very fact which the plaintiffs seek 
to have relitigated was in fact determined after a contest in 
the probate court. The plaintiffs' counsel admitted that the 
administrator had, not withheld any information from the 
Court, and that the Court was not prevented from passing upon 
- the subject matter and the issues which plaintiffs new seek 
to have litigated. Certainly there is a broad line of demarcation 
between the principles applicable to the facts of the Rice case 
which r.oerely affirmed the fundamental doctrine announced in 
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61; 25 L. Ed. 93, and 
our case, where the administrator in fact relied upon a judg-
ment of the court which passed upon the very questions in 
dispute. 
In re Pingree's Estate, 82 Utah 437, 25 Pac. (2d) 937, 
(1933), cited by appellants at Page 51 of their brief, ha~ no 
bearing upon the facts in this case. It is. true that the Court 
there stated that the special administratrix had a special duty 
to preserve property until a general administrator was ap-
pointed. However, the facts there have no application to 
the problems in the case at bar, and the case is not in point 
in any particular whatever. In the case at bar the fact is that 
the special administrator, whether it had such a duty or not, 
Yvhether it was empowered or not, made a very thorough and 
complete search for the plaintiffs in this action. That search 
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was made by one in privity with the general administrator as 
stated in the Pingree case. 
It is submitted that tlie Pingree case does not add. any 
strength whatever to appellant's position here. 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.} 54 Utah 181; 182 
Pac. 189 ( 1919) stands upon .its own facts and is certainly 
not authority for the proposition appellants contend , for in 
the case at bar. There the husband eloped with another 
woman and lived a fictitious name. When at his death she 
secured letters of administration and probated the estate under 
a representation that she was his wife, it was held that a 
court of equity had jurisdiction to set aside the proceeding 
on the ground that the notice required by the Utah Statute 
was not given. The Court stated: 
t tThis court is committed to the doctrine contended 
for by counsel for appellant, viz:. that probate pro-
. ceedings are in rem and that where the statutory notice 
has been given, all who are interested in the estate 
are bound by all orders and decrees entered in a par-
ticular case and that ordinarily the only remedy is by 
direct appeal." 
The court held that since none of the notices were given 
in the deceased's name, and since the entire proceeding was 
conducted with a view to preventing the known children and 
wife of the deceased from having the hearing, the Court was 
justified in setting t~e entire proceeding aside and the dis-
tribution aside on· the ground of extrinsic fraud. Certainly 
there can be no quarrel with such a decision with reference to 
the facts involved. 
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As heretofore stated, however, in the case at bar there 
\vas no failure to disclose, there was no probate in an im-
proper name, there was no lack of good faith on the part of 
the administrator. Instead of there being an effort to con-
ceal from the Court the name of the deceased and all of 
the appropriate circumstances, all of these matters were placed 
before the court in an extensive proceeding lasting nine months. 
Certain! y the facts in the Weyant case distinguish it from the 
principles applicable in the case at bar. 
Barfette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574; 106 Pac. 522 (1909) 
certainly does not add any strength to appellants' argument. 
The Court there affirmed positions taken in prior Utah cases 
that probate proceedings are in their nature proceedings in 
rem. The Court .held that when a petition for letters o( ad- ' 
ministration is filed and the notice is given by mailing and 
posting, as provided by the Utah statute, the whole world is 
brought before the Court. The Court stated that subsequent 
notices ({however important they may be in certain cases and 
under certain circumstances, are nevertheless not jurisdic-. 
tional; that is, are not made essential conferring power upon 
the court to act and hence to disregard them would constitute 
a mere irregularity which would have to be assailed and cor-
rected in a direct proceeding, and, if not so attacked, in the 
absence of fraud, would be conclusive as to all the world." 
This case is discussed in detail elsewhere in this bdef 
(Page 24). It is submitted that nothing in this case lends any 
support to the appellants' assertion that the administrator was 
guilty of fraud in the case at bar. 
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Appellants cite Child et al. v. District Court of the Second 
Judicial District, et al., 80 Utah 243; 14 Pac. (2d) 1110 
( 1932) for the proposition that an heir is entitled to notice 
of proceedings in a probate of an estate. Of course, this 
proposition if stated in the abstract is not deniable. However, 
there is nothing in this case that lends any support to the 
view of appellants as far as the facts in the case at bar are 
concerned. In the Child case the Court stated that a probate 
Court had jurisdiction to determine a _question of heirship 
at any time during the probate proceeding, and that was true 
before the time for final distribution. This case certainly is 
contrary to the view of appellants with respect to the propriety 
of the Findings, C·onclusions and Decree entered by Judge 
Jeppson in the Charles Carson Estate on or about July 22, 
1949, and the oral order made by Judge Jeppson on or about 
June lOth. Counsel in that case stated their proposition to be 
that ((there is no occasion for the determination of heirship 
until the time for distribution * * * unless there is some 
action to be taken in the distribution of the estate which 
may adversely affect the heirs' interest." The Court found, 
however, that nthe ·jurisdiction to determine heirship is in-
herent in the probate court to protect the interests of all the 
heirs. Where the court is given general jurisdiction, and no 
limitation is -placed on its exercise, it must be that it is given 
such power to properly discharge its general duty. The pro-
bate court is required to distribute the estate; it must require 
proof and it must determine questions of sale and mortgage 
of property, .and pass on the right to family allowance. If 
at any stage of the proceedings the Court, in order to properly 
discharge its general duty as a court of probate, should de-
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termine the question of heirship, in the absence of a statutory 
limitation on its right to do so, this court will not prohibit 
its free determination of that question., . 
It is again pointed out to the c·ourt that in the case .at 
bar counsel have expressly stipulated that the Court obtained 
jurisdiction of the Charles Carson Estate in the probate pro-
ceeding for that purpose. It was expressly stipulated, .more-
over, that proper notices were given on the petition for letters 
of administration and of the hearings pertment to the deter-
mination of questions involved in the conflicting petitions. 
Cer~ainly Exhibit L~2 is explicit on th~t subject. 
All of the notice which the law requires was. given to 
the plaintiffs in this action. It ·is. submitted that the Child 
case does not add any stature to their position. . 
At Page 79 of their brief appellants quote.from In Re Ste-
vens' Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 Pac. (~d) 85 (1942), where.the 
Court quoted from the case of In Re Listm·an's Estate, 57 Utah, 
471, 197 Pac. 596, 660 ( 1921). · The appellants, however, 
apparently failed to take into account in their citation .of the 
case the last sentence quoted, to-wit: ((He" (the administrator) 
((is not an insurer, and if he exercises ·ordinary care and .dili-
gence in the performance of his duties, he may not be held 
for a mistake or error in judgment." In that case the court 
stated that. the administrator rnade a reasonable attempt to 
. prevent the sale of certain stock. He acted reasonably and 
prudently in the light of the circumstances which then existed, 
and in view of that fact the decree of the lower court settling 
the account was approved. Certainly we subscribe to the 
question of law announced by the court in that case. 
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In the case at bar Norton knew of the long s.earch· made 
by at least two lawyers, . one trust officer and the deceased 
himself, comprising not less than sixty or seventy letters and 
involving one or more trips to the east to locate the children 
of Charles Carson. Norton further knew that all of the facts 
and proceedings before the Court had disclosed these searches . 
in great detail. He knew that based upon all of the evidence 
the Court had made a finding and decree in ·a controversy 
involving the very question that Mrs. Carson was the sole sur-
viving widow and the only known heir of Charles Carson. If 
acting upon this kf?.owledge and this determination of the Court 
is negligence, then certainly. Norton was negligent in this 
case. However, it may be assumed that under these circum-
stances the appellants could have produced evidence of what 
the standard of care is which a reasonably prudent man would 
have followed. Not only did appellants fail to produce and 
prove such a standard, but we submit that no such standard 
exists under the facts and circumstances of this case. Norton 
did act as a reasonable and prudent man in relying upon the 
order of the Court. He is not an insurer. 
It is submitted that the Stevens Estate case does not help 
the appellants in the case at bar. ~ 
The cases· cited by appellants under their· Point No. IV 
from jurisdictions other than . the State of Utah are also 
authority for a proposition not involved in the case at bar. 
None of them are in point. 
In Hewett, et al.J vs. Linstead, ,et al.J 122 P (2d) 352, 
(Dist. Ct. of App., 1942) erroneously cited by appellant as 
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122 P. 352, the petit~oner filed false petlttons alleging 
that there were no other heirs when he knew that there 
were, in fact, living heirs of the deceased. In Larrabee vs. 
Tracy, et al. (Sup. Ct. of Calif. 1943, 134 Pac. 2d 265 ), the 
executor led the daughter of the deceased legatee, who re-
sided outside of the state, to believe that she would receive · 
a share of the estate and he did not inform her that the execu:-
tor would dispute the daughter's right to share in it. He fur-
ther -lead her to believe that the distribution would be made 
as soot;1 as a fair P!ice could be obtained for certain real prop-
erty in the estate.· Correspondence covered a period of five 
years and the appellant never, ·at any time, indicated there was 
any question about respondent's right to be substituted in her 
mother's place~ Of course, the court held under· these cir- ~ 
cumstances that the failure to permit the ·claim to be litigated 
amounted to extrinsic fraud.· Certainly this is not the situa-
tion before the court in the case at bar. 
In Purinton vs. Dyson, 65 Pac. 2d 777, (Sup. Ct. of Calif. 
193 7, the court found that the executor filed his petition 
for probate of t~e .deceased's will at a time when he knew 
that the respondent was the granddaughter of the deceased; 
that she was residing· in Los· Angeles; and that his ·failure to. 
disclose her existence was for the purpose of defrauding. 
respondent out of her share of the estate. The executor then 
suppressed all information which he had from the court and 
represented Thomas Purinton to be the only son of the de-
ceased. Under these circumstances the Cali~ornia court, of 
course, held that the executor was guilty of extrinsic fraud 
because his act of omission and prevented resspondetns from 
. 57" 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
being heard. In the case at bar there is an express finding of 
the court and an admission by plaintiffs' counsel at the trial 
that the administrator and all persons in privity with him 
did not fail to disclose to the court any fact in their possession. 
Jn Caulk} et al vs. Lowe} et alJ. 178 Pac. 101 (Sup. Ct. 
of Okla. 1918) the administratrix represented that she was 
the sole heir of the deceased at a time when she knew that 
there was a living daughter of the deceased and it appears 
that the admi.nistratrix' nominee knew that the daughter was a 
non-resident of the State of Oklahoma. The court held that 
the fa~lure of the administratrix, who was nominee of Fannie 
M. Caulk, to give the notice prescribed by the Oklahoma 
Statute rendered the probate void and that the representation 
in view of the knowledge of Mary C. Lowe was extrinsic 
fraud. Under the circumstances the. court held that she was 
bound to disclose her know ledge to the court. It· is submitted · 
that these facts are not the facts before the court in the case 
at bar. 
In Jorgensen v. Jorgensen} 193 Pac. 2d 728, Sup. Ct. 
of Calif. 1948) the husband had not only concealed certain 
assets from his wife and the court at the time a property set-
tlemen agreement was made and approved by the court but 
he had misrepresented the amount of property at the· time 
that the settlement was entered into. The court stated that 
the husband was the manager of community property under 
the California Statute arid that as such he occupied a fiduciary 
relationship· to his wife and was bound to disclose to her in 
good faith all of the property at the .time of a settlement of 
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this kind (Pac. Rep. p. 733). The court stated that his vio-· 
lation of duty prevented the wife from a fair opportunity to 
submit her case fully to the court and that there was, there-
fore, extrinsic fraud from which the court of equity would 
grant relief. Certainly, this case is distinguishable on ·the facts. 
Crow 'VS. lviadsen, 111 Pac. 2d 7, (Dist. Ct. of App. 4th 
Dist. Calif. 1941), must also be distinguished from the case 
at _bar. There the executor did not report, inventory, or 
account for four parcels of real property and various J?ersonal 
property which belonged to the d~eased at the time of her 
death. Instead, the_ executors attempted to claim title through 
an assignment and purported deed from the decease~. Plain-
tiffs asserted that the ·purported deed and assignment was 
never executed and ·that it was never delivered; that it was 
without consideration and that there was · no intention to 
make a gift. The Court held that this action, which was all 
taken-by ·the executor with knowledge of the facts and knowl-
edge of the untruthfulness of the. petitions and other docu-
ments filed with the court, constituted extrinsic fraud and 
justified the intervention of a court of equity .. 
· B1:1t here again there was an affirmative representation 
to the court at a time when the executor _had knowledge that 
the representations made were untrue. As applied to the 
facts this is undoubtedly good law, but how can it be cited 
as· competent authority for th-e question before this court? 
In Anderson v. Lyons, 32 N. ·w~ (2d) 849 (Sup. Ct. 
of Minn.; 1948) the executor knowingly and inte~tionally 
concealed from the cour~ the existence of the plaintiff, who 
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was apparently a nephew of the deceased, thereby preventing 
him from making any claim in the estate. ·It appears from 
the discussion of the C'Ourt on Page 850 that the executor 
not only knew the name of plaintiff but also his place of 
residence. The Court said that failure to make the disclosure 
was fraud. We agree. How can this be authority for the . 
case at bar? 
In Hewitt v. Hewitt} 17 Fed. (2d) 916, (9 C. C. A. 
1927) ,the administratrix knew that her husband had an adopted 
son; she knew that the husband had made provisions for the 
son as late as 1920, thus indicating that the husband did 
not believe in the reported death of the son. She made no 
inquiry for the son at his last known place . of address or else-
where, and she knew that the court had no knowledge of the 
existence of the son. The son in this case had caused a tele-
phone call· to be made to Los Angeles about seven months 
after the death of Hewitt and the woman· who answered the 
.. 
'phone stated that Hewitt lived there but was out of town 
for about two weeks... While it did not appear who answered 
the telephone, the Court' obviously gave consideration to 
the fact that the son had been in touch with the whereabouts 
of Hewitt for some time and had employed attorneys to 
obtain infor~ation as to whether .he was living or dead. 
There is nothing in this case to in any way indicate or 
infer that if the Court had had the same knowledge that 
the administratrix did, that if a search had been conducted 
under the direction of the C'ourt for . a period of nine months 
in the probate of the' very estate in question, that the Court 
would have held that fail~re to make any further search or 
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to disclose the existence of the claim that plaintiff was an 
heir, would have constituted fraud. The facts in this case 
are clearly distinguishable and must be distinguished in fair-
ness to the case at bar. 
At no place in their briefs do appellants make one refer-
ence to the record where there is any evidence that the ad-
ministrator in the Charles Carson Estate had any knowledge 
that was not fully disclosed to the Court. At no place is 
there any evidence that Mrs. Carson had any knowledge that 
\Yas not disclosed to the Court. The fact that there was a 
claim of the existence of. two children was, of course, apparent 
from the file itself. · Notice was given to . the children in 
statutory form. The Court acquired jurisdiction of the estate 
without question. Nine months were spent making searches, 
conducting hearings. From sixty to seventy letters were sent 
by the special administrator alone. Carson himself had made 
a search. His attorneys had had correspondence with various 
public officers and private individuals in an endeavor to locate 
the plaintiffs. 
Paintiffs, if they · are the children, were living under 
names different from those by which·they had ever been known 
to their· father or to their other relatives or childhood ac-
quaintances. The Court had .possession of all knowledge 
and facts relating to purported .children and of the facts 
and claims as to the widow. It made a decision to the effect 
that Grace Catherine Sweeney Carson was the sole surviving 
heir of Charles Carson, deceased. 
In subsequent petitions the administrator Norton adopted 
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the finding of the Court and reported to the Court that she 
. was the sole surviving known heir.. · 
It is submitted that there is no authority and no law and 
no principle of justice which asserts that the defendant Norton 
is guilty of extrinsic fraud under these circumstances. Cer- · 
tainly appellants have been unable to point to any· such 
authority in. Utah or elsewhere in their brief in this case. 
POINT NO. V 
THERE WAS NO . PROOF IN THE . CASE AT BAR 
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD INFER THAT 
LOREN G. NORTON, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF CHARLES CARSON, DID NOT EXERCISE 
THE CARE. AND PRUDENCE OF A REASONABLY PRU-
DENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH RESPECT TO THE 
MATTER OF GIVING NOTICES AND MAKING ANY 
SEARCH FOR THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION. 
· Plaintiffs and Appellants urge in their brief under Point 
No. 5 in substance that Loren G. Norton was guilty of negli-
gence in failing to make further search for the· alleged chil-
dren of Charles Carson during the administration of his es-
tate. The appellants cite In Re Stevens Estate, 102 Utah, 255, 
130 P 2d 85 (1942), Welch v. Flory, et al, 200 N.E. 
900, (Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 1936, and Morri.r 
v. Mull, 144 N.E. 436, (Sup. Ct. of Ohio, ( 1924). These 
cases do not assert the proposition that an adtninistrator 
is liable for failure to make a search on the grounds of ex-
trinsic fraud, or that the Decree of Distribution can be held 
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for naught and set aside in ~.ffect for failure to make a search. 
The question of fraud was not even considered. 
The Utah case has been discussed heretofore. It holds 
in effect that \vhen an administrator exercises the care of a 
reasonable man, he is not liable for mistake or error in judg-
ment. 
In Welch v. Flory, supra, neither the administrator nor 
any other person interested . in the estate wrote any letters or 
solicited any knowledge of the alleged heirs from the Police 
Department of Boston. The fact of the claim of an heir was 
never brought to the attention of the probate judge. The ad-
ministrator did not examine the city records o~ seek any in-
formation from that source by letters of inquiry. He did· not 
even address a letter to· the alleged heir or examine the Boston 
City Directory. 
Certainly in the cas·e at bar the situation is entirely differ- · 
ent. As has been heretofore reiterated, a search was made for 
nine months by the court, the special administrator ·and his 
counsel,· and the deceased and his counsel before that. Letters 
were addressed to the public officials in all of the states where 
there was any indication that the alleged heirs may be locat-
ed. Nearly $1,000.00 was paid out of the estate funds to the 
persons engaged in this search. The. search made by the 
deceased prior to his death-personal visits to all of the prior 
residences of the family in North Dakota and Chicago-and 
was reported to . the court and came to the attention of the 
administrator. Based on the . evidence ·of these efforts, the 
judge made its Order, supported by Findings -and Conclusions, 
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to the effect that Mrs. Carson was the only known heir. Cer-
tainly the standard of reasonableness which the court passed 
in Welch v. Flory is not applicable to the standard of Norton. 
in the case at bar. 
In Morris v. ·Mull, the Supreme Court of Ohio, 144 NE 
436 ( 1924), cited by appellants on page 83 of their brief, 
pointed out· that no notice whatever was given to the sister 
of the executor. ((It is true that he claimed to have written 
letters which were returned to him; yet unfortunately they 
;vere not produced in evidence.;' The court pointed up facts 
'which· indicated that the executor knew of the whereabouts 
·•, 
of ~his sister and had nevertheless reported to the probate court 
that he did not know her address and had not heard from her 
for more than fou~ years. The executor there had not fol-
lowed the ·means. of information at his disposal relative to 
the whereabouts of h1s sister. The court held that there was 
a lack of good faith and a failure to use any diligence to 
learn the· whereabouts of his sister.· 
Certainly the facts in the Morris v. Mull cas.e must be 
distinguished from the case at bar. Here, after the contest 
which lasted nine months, the administrator, not being trained 
in the law and not understanding fully the complexities of 
the probate procedure, relied· upon his attorneys and the find-
ings of ·the probate judge that Grace Catherine Carson was 
the sole surviving heir. 
It is easy enough, as Judge Lewis· pointed out at the trial, 
to look back . now and say that most diligent administrators 
would have ma_de application to the court for further instruc-
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tions. However, the la\v ~oes not require an administrator to 
possess the learning of a historian looking on the matter in 
retrospect. 
Bancroft states (Bancroft Probate Practice, Second Edi-
tion, Vol. II, page 282, Sec. 3 3 5) : nThe duty of making an 
investigation of the claims of alleged . heirs· and of taking or 
considering the dispositions in connection with their claims 
is likewise riot part of the ordinary duties of an adJ?inistrator." 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held in Black's Estate, 
30 Wyo. 55, 215 P. 1059 (1923i), that searches for heirs and 
investigators' claims of heirs was not an ordinary duty of an 
administrator. Bancroft says tl;lat tin general, his duties are 
to preserve the estate until distribution, to collect and safely 
keep the property, to pay the indebtedness of the deceased. 
and tPe charges of administration, and to put the estate in 
such a condition that distribution may be had, and, when 
claims are satisfied, to pass the estate pursuant to order of court 
on to those entitled." Supra, page 279, Sec 334. As between the 
contesting heirs or legatees, an administrator or executor is 
a mere stakeholder and his duties are passive. 
There is. no need. to speculate in this case as to whether 
the probate judge might have or could have, or even should 
have made an order requiring the use of estate funds to make 
further search for alleged children of Charles Carson before 
· the estate was distributed. As heretofore pointed out, the 
only way in which the plaintiffs can recover in this case is by· 
showing extrinsic fraud. It is sincerely submitted that acting 
upon and pursuant to the order of the court in making dis-
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tribution under the circumstances of this case certainly was 
not negligent. A fortiora there was no indication of fraud. 
A proper considera:tion of alleged negligence by the ad-
ministrator in not making a further search for Charles Carson's 
children in the case at bar is the matter of proximate cause and 
the fact that both plai~tiffs in this action lived under such 
circumstances that it is very probable that an expenditure 
of several thousand dollars could not disclose their where-
abouts. It is entirely speculative as to whether the plaintiffs 
ever could have been found ~y the most diligent search. Mil-
dred · Molinari could not remember the number of names 
she had us.ed since 192~· (R. 469). While her best judgment 
at the commencement of the cross examination was that there 
were about five (Ibid) , it appeared that she used the name 
Mildred Allen in Detroit, Mildred Pelligrini in Chicago, Ann 
Manners in Chicago, Mildred Felli in California, Marian 
Ruso, Joan Wood in Chicago, Marcella Gordon in Chicago, 
and Mildred Pelligrini in Milwaukee. In 1941 she gave her 
name as Mildred Pelligrini in Chicago, and in August, 1948, 
and January, 1950, in Chicago she gave her name as Mildred 
Pelligrini. 
These names were given to public officers, i. e. judges, 
police sergeants, clerks of courts in the various cities and on 
the dates named (See R. 469-4 7 4) . She admitted that she 
had· never represented herself to any public official as Mildred 
Molinari, and she could not remember one instance where 
she· had made a public record under that name. She owned 
real property in the names of her two boys (R. 477); she 
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had been in touch with none of her relatives or the relatives 
of her husband or family. It appears that she could name 
no relatives that even knew her address for a period of several 
years (R. 486-487). She had never made any effort ·to find out 
what happened to her father's property at Vetal, South Dakota 
(R. 487); she had no social security number (R. 492), and 
she was not listed in a telephone directory either by her busi-
ness or personal address or under her name (R. 492-494.) She 
has never owned an automobile (R. 496); she could not 
remember ever having a driver's lice~se (R. 495) except 
\vhen she was in California she had a license under the name 
Pelligrini (R. 497). 
She stated ~hat she had voted in Chicago since 193 7 under 
the name Pelligrini (R. 499) . 
Can it be stated that the proximate cause of any failure . 
to find Mrs. Pelligrini was a lack of diligence by the adminis-
trator? A purposeful plan· to cut herself off from all of her 
relatives and friends could hardly have been more complete. 
The other plaintiff was known since 1927 or 1926 under 
the name Tillier. He was never known under the name Tiller 
or Swann. The driver's licenses and renewals identified as 
"Exhibit A" all refer to ((Robert Tillier." The City of Chicago 
Vehicle Licenses for 1947, 1948 and 1949 refer to nTillier." 
The chauffeurs iicenses introduced for the years· -1942, 
1945, 1946, 1948 refer to ((Robert Tillier." See also Ex-
hibits D, E, F, and G, showing that all the chauffeur's 
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and driver's licenses, registrations as a voter, the name 
given to his employer and the name to which his tele-
phone bill was sent was I(Tillier." Exhibit H shows that 
~is rent was· pai~ under the name ((Tillier." Exhibit I indi~ 
cates that his light bills were paid under this name. Exhibit 
J shows that his gas bills were paid as Tillier, and Exhibit 
K shows that his income tax returns were made under the 
name ((Tillier." 
This plaintiff stated on cross examination that he changed 
his name from ((Swann" to ((Tillier" in approximately 1927 
because he wanted to get back to the family name but he did 
not remember of his father ever having his name different than 
((Tiller." This plaintiff also lost all contact with his family and · 
friends. -He never made any attempt to locate his father, 
except one inquiry of the. county recorder at Martin, South 
Dakota, in or· about the year 1947, respecting property. 
Whether this plaintiff made an effort knowingly to lose his 
identity rna y be an open question. Whether he did or not, 
a more complete job in obtaining this result could hardly 
be imagined.. 
Can it be stated that there is sufficient evidence other than 
speculation that the most diligent administ~ator could have 
found plaintiffs? For nearly twenty years they lived under 
names unknown to their former associates and their relatives·. 
They chose to cut themselves off from their father's family 
and their mother's fatnil y and if one letter was sent by either 
of them to detennine the whereabouts of the father during 
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this entire period of time, that represents the total extent of 
their concern for h~. If children thus choose to ignore their 
family ties, live in seclusion, cut off their identity and cut all 
contacts with their friends and relatives, some consideration 
should be given to the possibility that they should bear the 
consequences of their own lack of interest. 
CONCLUSION· 
In this case the· trial court dismissed the action after 
hearing plaintiff's evidence on the theory that it was insuff i- . 
cient as a matter of law to show any fraud or other . breach 
. . 
of duty. The probate proceedings being in rem and . being 
in compliance with _the Utah Statutes the determinations made 
on these proceedings were res adjudicata. It is true that if 
the plaintiffs are in fact the children of Charles ·carson, the 
effect of the finalitY of the probate decree may result in some 
apparent hardship· as to them. At least the hopes which have 
been developed since the decree was entered _may meet . with 
disappointment and frustration .. But the policy of the iaw _ 
is to require that issues come to final rest after adjudication. 
Probate matters cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely. Indeed 
·it must be admitted in perfect cand~r that most probate ·pro-· · 
ceedings are open too long to sati~fy reasonable requirements 
of justice and expeditious· handling. 
It is subrp.itted that those considerations C?f public policy 
\vhich require complete determination of various matters in 
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probate proceedings require that the determination of trial court 
in the case at bar be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for defendant} The Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corporation} Ltd. 
SBIELDS & SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for E. LeRoy Shields, E. LeRoy Shields} Executor 
of the Estate of Grace Catherine Carson} Loren G. Norton} 
administrator of the estate of Grace Catherine Carson}. 
deceased} and Loren G. N ortonJ individually. 
R. VERN McC·ULLOUGH, 
Attorney for cross defendant Edith Hazelrigg 
JOHN D. RICE, 
Attorney for cross defendant Cathedral of the Magdalene 
Catholic Church} also known as Roman Catholic Bishop 
of Salt Lake City) a corporation sole .. 
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